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1 Introduction
The surge in bilateral gross international financial flows is a distinguishing fea-
ture of globalization. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) show that the ratio of the
sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP has grown by a factor of 7 over
1970–2004, from 45% to over 300%, with a strong acceleration starting in the mid-
1990s. Indeed, financial globalization has outstripped the growth of trade. And
although the recent financial crisis has determined a temporary stop in the process,
at least in some countries,1 the long-run trend still points in the direction of further
integration among both developed and developing countries.
Ample evidence suggests that a prominent role in this process of international
financial integration is played by major financial institutions, in particular multina-
tional banks. Furthermore, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has shown that large gross
cross-border interbank positions were a major cause of the worldwide instability of
the financial system (Caballero, 2010; Haldane, 2009).
Building on these stylized facts, this paper examines the role played by the
characteristics of the banking industry in each country on cross-border banking
positions, with a particular focus on the distribution of bank size. The analysis is
nested within a two stage gravity framework.
Gravity equations provide a natural setting for studying patterns of interna-
tional integration, including cross-border banking activities. Despite some limita-
tions in their theoretical justifications (but see Martin and Rey, 2004; Head and
Ries, 2008; Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012), the empirical literature has shown
that gravity-like equations can go a long way in explaining not only the pattern
of bilateral trade but also that of cross-border financial positions (Portes and Rey,
2005; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). As in the trade literature, a large number of
factors have been found to impact on the strength of bilateral cross-border linkages
in financial markets, from country size and geographical distance, to institutional
and cultural differences, to characteristics of the origin and destination countries,
such as the development of the domestic financial system.
An aspect that so far has been overlooked in the literature is the structure of the
banking sector in each country (origin and destination), including the distribution
of banks by size, the degree of competition, the presence of foreign intermediaries.
Industry sector characteristics have been shown to exercise a crucial impact on
countries’ international trade patterns, and firm size distribution is a key statistic
in the “new-new” trade theory (Melitz, 2003), both on exports and on imports
(Bernard et al., 2007). We are interested to investigate whether this is also the case
for banks’ financial claims.
Interestingly, adopting the framework of gravity equations, Barba Navaretti
et al. (2015) and Pietrovito et al. (2013) have recently shown that it is not only the
average firm size that matters, but also higher moments measuring the asymmetry
of the distribution by size, such as skewness. While the same case can presumably
be made for financial transactions, the empirical literature on the the patterns of
1see, for example, (Buch et al., 2014b; Amiti et al., 2017).
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cross-border interbank integration has so far ignored the role of the distribution of
financial institutions by their size.
This paper aims at filling these gaps in the literature. Following Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Head and Ries (2008), we adopt a two-steps empirical method-
ology. First, we estimate a standard gravity model on the bilateral international
claims from BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics data (CBS), including bilateral
characteristics and country fixed effects. Second, we regress different moments of
the distribution of bank by asset size on the fixed effects estimated in the first stage
gravity regression, controlling for a set of other country specific characteristics. We
control very carefully especially for the degree of competition in the banking in-
dustry, because bank size can indeed be related to he degree of competition in the
market, and for the presence of foreign bank ownership, as this may in principle
mechanically affect the results, as further discussed below.
Our results show that higher moments of the distribution of banks by asset size
are significantly related to the patterns of bilateral cross-border financial integra-
tion, consistent with findings in the domain of international trade Barba Navaretti
et al. (2015).
In particular, we find convincing evidence that countries where the distribution
of banks by asset size is more right-skewed, i.e. with few large banks together with
many small ones, lend and receive larger amounts of funds internationally. This
result is on top of the common effect, that we also identify, that a larger average
size of the banks in a country implies more funds from foreign banks. The result
is also independent of the degree of competition in the banking sector and foreign
ownership. Once again, it’s important to note that the result does not refer to the
known effect of large banks, but rather on the asymmetry in the distribution of
banks’ size in a country.
Why few large banks coexisting with many small ones are able to lend more
abroad and to attract more foreign funding? We reasonably expect that holders,
and especially recipients of foreign claims, are the few large banks and not the many
small ones in the countries with more skewed distributions. One may think that
the presence of multinational banks plays a role in our results. These large banks in
countries with skewed distributions may be multinational banks which have better
access to the international inter-bank market, especially across their own affiliates.
For this reason, in the second stage we explicitly take into account the impact of
both modes of the bank internationalization process, controlling for the presence of
foreign subsidiaries in each country, and for the number of foreign subsidiaries that
banks in each country hold abroad. Moreover, since we use international claims, we
exclude (by definition of international claims) the local claims of foreign affiliates
in the local currency. Although international claims still account for local claims in
foreign currency of foreign affiliates, Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) provide evidence
that at the aggregate level they are of very limited relevance. Therefore, one should
rather focus on understanding why large banks are seen as more interesting and safer
partners in a country when they are associated with many small competitors there.
We think that these countries with skewed distributions of banks are characterized
by a dual banking system with the few large banks standing out, both from the
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view point of their foreign lenders and in terms of their specialization in domestic
lending, as we now explain.
As for specialization, in a dual banking system, large banks may efficiently
focus on lending to large and transparent firms, whilst the small banks are typically
specialized in lending to more opaque SMEs (e.g., Berger et al., 2005). When instead
banks are of more similar size, they specialize less and may then end up being less
efficient. In the end, they turn out to be less capable of accessing international
markets. Fixed costs and scale economies may also play a role in specializing and
activating international financial transactions with banks of a foreign a country.
These costs are typically on both sides of a bank’s activity, lending and borrowing.
The larger the scale of international financial transactions the lower is the per-
transaction cost. In a dual banking environment, the large bank can operate as
an efficient gateway for their own transactions (lending and borrowing) but also
for those of the many small banks through, for example, the domestic inter-bank
market. When instead the banks are of more similar size, some of the largest banks
could still afford the cost of dealing internationally although at a lower and less
efficient scale.
Consider now the perception of foreign lenders. From their view point, larger
banks may be willing to take on larger risks by acquiring foreign claims, and foreign
lenders ready to deal with them, due to an implicit subsidy for too-big-to-fail banks.
From the view point of foreign partners, lending to a country could be safer when
a few large banks clearly stand out as too-big-too fail in a country, in contrast with
many medium-sized banks that could be left failing in case of distress. This implicit
public guarantee makes the few large banks in the country with skewed banking
system relatively safer and then more attractive for cross-border lending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the
literature that is most relevant for our analysis; Section 3 describes the sources
of the data used in the empirical analysis; Section 4 explains the identification
strategy and the econometric methodology adopted; Section 5 presents the baseline
results, and Section 6 a number of robustness checks. The last Section concludes
and discusses some policy implications.
2 Literature
This paper refers to three major strands of literature. Starting from the lit-
erature on internationalization and firm size (e.g., Melitz, 2003), it contributes to
the literature on gravity models, in particular those focusing on the explanation of
financial transactions (e.g., Portes and Rey, 2005; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008), as
well as to the literature on financial globalization and cross-border financial linkages
(e.g., Buch et al., 2014b; Niepmann, 2015).
New-new trade literature has emphasized the role of the size of firms as a key
determinant of their degree of internationalization, with respect to both exports
(e.g., Melitz, 2003) and foreign direct investments (Helpman et al., 2004, e.g.,).
And indeed a large strand of empirical literature has confirmed the theoretical
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predictions, showing that larger firms are more international (see, e.g., Ottaviano
and Mayer, 2011). Also for financial intermediaries, size is a major determinant
of the degree of internationalization (see, e.g., Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005, in the
case of cross-border bank M&As). These results hinge on the hypothesis that there
are significant fixed costs in the process of internationalization, that only the larger
firms and banks can overcome in order to reap the benefits of accessing larger
markets. Our analysis contributes to this literature verifying if these empirical
regularities fixed costs are confirmed also in the case of bank cross-border asset
holdings, in particular when associated with a skewed distribution of banks.
The second strand of literature related to our analysis is that of empirical grav-
ity models. Gravity models are usually used to identify the drivers of trade flows
between countries. Starting from the very basic equation, in which geographical
distance and each country’s size explains the volume of bilateral trade (Timbergen
(1962)), gravity models typically include both bilateral characteristics – such as
the distance between two countries or whether they share a common border, that
are defined dyadic characteristics because they describe the relationship between
country couples – as well as separate characteristics of each country involved in
a transaction. The empirical literature following the first specifications has pro-
gressively augmented the set of both country specific and dyadic variables that are
assumed to contribute to the explanation of bilateral flows.
Only recently firms heterogeneity has been added in structural estimations of
gravity models (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for a survey). Within the standard
trade model with heterogeneous firms a´ la Melitz (2003) only first moments of
productivity distributions are shown to have an impact on aggregate trade flows.
But several recent contributions have shown that the restrictive conditions of the
standard trade model (Pareto distributions, CES demand functions and iceberg
trade costs) do not stand to empirical scrutiny (e.g., Base et al., 2015; Melitz
and Redding, 2015). In particular, Barba Navaretti et al. (2015) shows that
aggregate exports are not only associated to firms’ average productivity but also
to higher moments of the distribution, measuring dispersion and asymmetry. Our
contribution follows Barba Navaretti et al. (2015), to examine whether aggregate
cross-border banking activities are somehow related to different moments of banks’
size distributions.
Gravity models are also embedded in the analysis of international financial
transactions, that is closer to our contribution. Existing results confirm that geo-
graphical distance is detrimental not only to trade flows, but also to financial flows.
For instance, this is the outcome of Portes and Rey (2005), who estimate the role
of market size, trading technologies and distance in explaining international asset
transactions. Despite their virtual and intangible nature, the volume of traded
assets is negatively affected by distance, which may account for informational fric-
tions. Information costs are also at the core of the analysis of Daude and Fratzscher
(2008), who observe a pecking order in cross-border capital investments as coun-
tries become more financially integrated. The behavior of these alternative capital
investments may stem from information frictions and/or the quality of institutions
in the host country. Interestingly, FDI and loans are more sensible than other port-
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folio investment instruments to information frictions, captured by physical distance
and other measures.2 Moreover, FDI and loans are less sensitive to institutions’
quality – measured by expropriation risks, reputation costs, and corruption degrees
– which may instead better explain the direction of other portfolio investments. The
institutional background is also at the center of Papaioannou (2009) who, among
others, observe that institutions and size, measured by GDP, enhance a country’s
ability to attract cross-border claims from abroad.
Apart from geographical distance, transaction and information costs may also
arise because of cultural differences between countries. Kleimeier et al. (2014)
consider the relation between cultural differences and financial integration and dis-
integration during normal times as well as financial crises. They exploit data on the
deposits of the Euro area from 1999 to 2011, and split their analysis before and after
2007. They observe that, shortly after 2002, a general feeling of financial stabil-
ity and confidence in the new single currency, also called “Europhoria”, promoted
cross-border deposits, counterbalancing cultural distance. After the 2007 financial
crises, instead, this pattern was reversed. The single currency was no longer able
to offset cultural differences, and the Eurozone experienced a period of financial
disintegration and a decline in cross-border deposits.
Gravity models may also explain the role of banks in facilitating firms’ access
to foreign markets. Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), for instance, embed the joint ef-
fect of geographical distance and financing costs in a standard gravity equation of
international trade, and observes that financing costs, measured by interest rate
margins, hamper trade, and the effect increases with distance. In a similar vein,
Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) show that international trade related fi-
nancing increases with the level of aggregate risks and exhibits a hump-shaped
pattern in country-specific risk. Interestingly, the negative effect of distance is once
again confirmed: an increase in the time required to trade does not only hamper
international trade, but it also reduces trade finance.
These findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical literature. Portfo-
lio theory models have generally proposed an explanation for cross-border banking
that relies on asset diversification strategies (see, among others, Buch et al., 2014a).
But other theoretical contributions on cross-border banking deviate from portfolio
composition models to provide alternative explanations. For instance, Ennis (2001)
suggests that banks engage in cross-regional activities so as to overcome potential
information problems related to geographical distance. Also, different banking and
financial regulatory frameworks may explain the direction of cross-border banking
(see Morrison and White, 2009; Acharya, 2003). In particular, Houston et al. (2012)
shows that banks prefer to transfer funds to markets with fewer regulations, but
this is more true if the laxer regulation of the recipient country is mitigated by
stronger property and creditor rights. Recently, Niepmann (2015) has proposed an
alternative framework in which financial transactions, in terms of both assets and
liabilities, are the endogenous outcome of two sources of country heterogeneity:
2These include the volume of bilateral phone traffic, the bilateral trade in newspapers,
and bilateral migration flows.
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differences in factor endowments and differences in the efficiency of the banking
sectors. These two elements, jointly considered, can explain different banking in-
ternationalization patterns – such as international banking, global banking, and
foreign sourcing – that also emerge in the estimation of a gravity equation.
However, contrary to trade gravity models, that have nowadays strong theoret-
ical foundations (see, e.g., the seminal contribution by Anderson and van Vincoop
, 2003), gravity models for financial transactions still pose substantial theoretical
challenges, as shown by Okawa and van Wincoop (2012). Among the most in-
teresting contributions, Martin and Rey (2004) and Courdacier and Martin (2006)
presents a theoretical framework in which the presence of fixed costs of cross-border
financial transactions provides a testable financial gravity equation, and Head and
Ries (2008) obtains a similar equation under the hypothesis of information asym-
metries between countries.
Our paper contributes to these strands of literature investigating the role of
relative size of banks in domestic markets and its consequences in banks’ ability to
participate international financial markets. To our knowledge, this has not been
studied before. We also provide interpretations of the results that shed light on the
functioning of the lender/borrower cross-border relationships.
3 Data
A large number of measures have been proposed to study globalization of fi-
nancial markets (see, e.g., Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, and the survey by Kose
et al., 2009). However, most of them are aggregate indices providing a synthetic
measure of the degree of integration of one or more financial markets of a given
country with the rest of the world. Since our analysis is based on the framework of
gravity models, it requires information on bilateral positions of each country with
respect to a set of other countries. For example, we need information on the gross
value of the foreign assets (and eventually liabilities) held by UK banks in Ger-
many, France, USA, etc.. To the best of our knowledge, the most reliable source of
these information is the BIS Consolidated banking statistics database (CBS), that
provides quarterly information on the outstanding amounts of total claims, interna-
tional claims and local liabilities of banks for 31 BIS “lending countries” to over 100
destination countries.3 These information can be classified according to the type of
risk intrinsic to the transaction, by maturity, by instrument, and also by the type
of recipient sector (all sectors, banks, non bank financial institutions, government,
private sector).4 To perform our analysis, we focus on international claims, which
are reported on an immediate risk basis (i.e., assuming that the counterparty is
3Lending countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Chinese
Taipei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, India, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
4See Avdjiev et al. (2015) for an accurate and updated description of the BIS CBS
database.
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the entity with whom the bank contracts to lend or borrow). We choose to focus
on data on an immediate risk basis because the main focus of our analysis is on
the ability of different banking systems to gain access to foreign funding, and not
on how risks are distributed as a result of such activities. Besides, information on
claims on an immediate risk basis are available for a larger set of countries than that
on an ultimate risk basis. However, in the robustness checks Section we also verify
that our results are partly confirmed when considering international claims on an
ultimate risk basis (i.e., taking account of credit risk mitigants, such as collateral,
guarantees and credit protection bought, that transfer the bank’s credit exposure
from a counterparty in one nation to another counterparty in another nation). Fig-
ure 1 presents the evolution of a two-years moving average of quarterly data on the
total value of international claims between 2000 and 2013, distinguishing lending
countries – those holding foreign assets – and borrowing countries – those where
the lending countries hold their assets – according to their income level, following
the definition of the World Bank. Both panels show a positive trend in the value
of international claims until 2007, and a small reduction in the following years, but
not for lower-income countries.5
Following the recent empirical literature, we estimate an augmented gravity
model accounting for a number of characteristics of the countries analyzed and of
their bilateral relationships. Data are from standard sources. Geographical dis-
tance and other data on bilateral relationships between country pairs (e.g., proxim-
ity, common language, common legal origin) are from the CEPII database. GDP is
from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. Characteristics of the finan-
cial sector are from the 2016 release of the Global Financial Development Dataset
(GFDD) produced by the World Bank.
Finally, the characteristics of the distribution of banks by asset size, our key
variable of analysis, are obtained using bank level information from the Bankscope
data set. We select banks located in the lending and borrowing countries of the
CBS sample with at least 1 billion USD of total assets. When both consolidated
and unconsolidated baking statement are available, we use the latter, to avoid the
potential bias caused by the fact that the consolidated statement includes also the
activity of foreign subsidiaries. Banks for which we use consolidated balance sheet
data represent 15% of all banks in our sample (30% in term of total assets).Although
Bankscope does not provide a full coverage of the banking sectors of some countries,
its representativeness is indeed very high, and in fact it is the most widely used
data base to conduct cross-country analysis on individual bank data. Despite a
number of differences in how banks report the value of their total assets in individual
statements and in official statistics collected by central banks, Duprey and Le (2016)
show for example that, in the case of European countries, the sum of total assets of
individual banks reported in Bankscope are comparable to those published by the
ECB. A comparison of our data with those collected by the IMF in its Financial
5Although the BIS Consolidated banking statistics database (CBS) suffers from number
of structural breaks, in our sample their size is never larger than 2% of the total value of
total claims, with the only exception of the first quarter of 2009, when it reaches 4%.
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soundness indicators initiative show that also in the case of non-European countries
the total assets of banks representativeness of the Bankscope sample is in the same
order of magnitude of that in the euro area.6 The aggregate value of gross loans
reported in Bankscope is also on average about 2/3 of the value of private credit
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions reported in the Global
Financial Development Dataset (GFDD) produced by the World Bank, that is
available for a larger number of the countries and years in our sample. Finally,
since our measures could suffer if only a few banks were recorded by Bankscope in
some countries and years, we only include in our sample those countries for which
at least 10 banks are present.7
It is also important to notice that Bankscope tends to under-represent smaller
banks, as we do by excluding from our sample of banks with less than 1 billion
USD of total assets. However, this would affect our measures of the asymmetry
of the distribution by reducing the degree of skewness, and therefore introducing
a bias not in favor but against our hypothesis. It is therefore likely that with full
representativeness of all banking systems in the world, that unfortunately is not
available, our results would be stronger than what we find.
In our baseline specification, we use total assets to proxy the size of a bank,
and we reconstruct the distribution moments on the country-year distributions: we
compute the first two moments (mean and variance) and also the third asymmetry
moment (skewness). A symmetric distribution has a skewness of zero, and positive
values signal a longer right tail associated with a relatively few but large institutions
and most of the mass with small institutions.
In the robustness checks we consider alternative measures of banks size, from
gross loans, to other assets and equity. Our final sample consists of approximately
160, 000 observations on quarterly bilateral lending-borrowing (i.e. lending country-
borrowing country) relationships from 2000 to the end of 2013.
More precisely, total claims are by country and are expressed as 1+ the log of
billion USD. Average bank size is expressed in million of USD. The coefficient of
variation is the second moment of the distribution of bank size, and the asymmetry
of bank size is measured by the skewness, the third moment of the distribution.
We measure competition using the Boone index, that is the percentage change
in bank’s profits due to 1 percent change in marginal costs, see Boone (2008).
Higher values of the Boone index indicate less bank competition.8 International
Financial Restriction is an index of overall restrictions on capital movements by
country and year calculated by Fernandez et al. (2015) based on IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions. The ratio of foreign
6For example, in 2010 the ratio the sum of total assets of individual banks reported
in Bankscope to that in the IMF database ranges from a bit less than 60% in Bosnia
Herzegovina, to 77% in Russia, 90% in the United Kingdom, 100% in Turkey and in the
Czech Republic, to values larger than 100% in other countries.
7Our results are confirmed when the analysis is conducted on the full sample of countries
and on a sample of countries for which at least 25 banks are present.
8In unreported regressions, available upon request, we have verified that we obtain
similar results measuring competition with the Lerner index produced by the World Bank.
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banks to that of total banks by country and year is produced by the World Bank’s
Global financial data base.9 The absolute number of subsidiaries owned abroad
by banks in each country is from Claessens and van Horen (2014). Distance is
measured as 1+ the log of the weighted distance between two countries, accounting
for the within country distribution of population. Finally, Common legal origin is
a dummy taking the value of 1 if a the borrowing and lending countries share a
common legal origin, Common border takes the value of 1 if they share a common
border, Common language is 1 if at least 9% of the population in the borrowing
and lending countries speaks the same language, Former colonial relationship is 1
if the countries share a common colonizer. Table 1 reports a brief description of
the variables used in the regressions and their sources.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the
econometric analysis, distinguishing also in this case between lending and borrowing
countries.
Both for lending and borrowing countries, skewness is always positive, suggest-
ing a right-skewed bank size distribution. On average, foreign owned banks are
close to 40% of all banks, although with a very high variability. The number of
foreign subsidiaries owned abroad varies between 1 and over 1, 000.
Table 3 presents the values of the bilateral correlation indices between the
main variables used in our gravity model. The asymmetry of the distribution of
bank size shows a positive and statistically significant correlation with the level
of international claims, for both lending and borrowing countries, providing some
preliminary evidence consistent with the hypothesis that countries with larger banks
hold a higher amount of both foreign banking assets and liabilities. The asymmetry
of the distribution of bank size has a statistically insignificant correlation with the
Boone index. This suggests that our measure of asymmetry should not be related
with competition in the banking industry.
4 Empirical model
The recent theoretical literature on trade gravity equations has shown that
unbiased estimations require that the empirical model controls for the role of the
“multilateral resistance”, that accounts for the whole set of country characteristics
affecting a country’s overall import and export levels. Empirically, this amounts
to including a full set of time-varying dummies for both origin and destination
countries (see Head and Mayer (2014) for a thorough description of this issue).
Of course, this poses a serious problem when one’s interest is on country specific
characteristics, that cannot be estimated because they are perfectly collinear with
the dummies.
One way to address this well known and established empirical problem is the
two-step approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Head and Ries (2008), that
9Unfortunately, the ratio of total assets of foreign banks to total bank assets is available
only for a smaller subset of countries in our sample; however, for these countries the
correlation between these two measures is positive and highly statistically significant.
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imposes very weak structural assumptions on the underlying model by allowing to
retrieve the fixed effects (the multilateral resistance terms) once all the standard
dyadic features are netted out. According to this approach, in the first stage we
estimate the following standard gravity regression on our panel data of outstanding
stocks of international claims of the banks of the lending country in the borrowing
country, including lending-country/quarter and borrowing-country/quarter fixed
effects:
log claimsLBt = a1 + aLt + aBt + a2(bilateral characteristics)LBt + εLBt (1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of international claims between (the
banks of) the lending country L and the borrowing country B in quarter t; the terms
aLt and aBt are the lending and borrowing countries quarter fixed effects; and εLBt
is the residual. In this first stage regression, we estimate the impact of standard
gravity bilateral characteristics, such as the logarithm of distance, common borders,
common language, etc.
Then, in the second stage, we estimate the impact of the main features of
the lending and borrowing countries on the fixed effects aLt and aBt. We control
for countries characteristics (of the lending and borrowing country, respectively
cou. char.Lt and cou. char.Bt). However, our focus is especially on the character-
istics of distribution of bank size, measured by its moments, the logarithm of the
mean value of each bank’s total assets and by higher order moments, in particular
the skewness that measures the asymmetry of the distribution (bank size mom.Lt
and bank size mom.Bt). We estimate the following regressions:
aLt = b1+b2 (cou. char.Lt)+b3 (bank size mom.Lt)+b4 (time dummies)+εLt (2)
aBt = b1+b2 (cou. char.Bt)+b3 (bank size mom.Bt)+b4 (time dummies)+εBt (3)
5 Baseline results
The top part of table 4 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1),
the first stage gravity regression model, on international bank claims. To control
for the potential impact of the structural breaks in the BIS Consolidated banking
statistics, we have trimmed our dependent variable omitting all observations with a
rate of growth above the values at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the overall distri-
bution. Since we include quarter/lending-country and quarter/borrowing-country
dummies, we can only include dyadic variables, that describe the bilateral relation-
ship between lending and borrowing countries. After some specification search, we
finally include the logarithm of the geographic bilateral distance, and four dum-
mies that take the value of one if: 1) a language is spoken by at least 9% of the
population in both countries (Common ethno-language); 2) the two countries share
a common colonizer after 1945 (Common colonizer); 3) the two countries share a
common legal origin (Common legal origin); 4) the two countries share a common
border (Contiguity). The R2 of the regression of 0.268, that is high for a panel data
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regression, is explained by the large number of dummies included in the specifica-
tion. Reassuringly, we have verified that the fixed effects estimated using slightly
different specifications of the first stage gravity regression model are very similar,
with bilateral correlations around 0.99.
Although the main reason of the first stage is to obtain the multilateral resis-
tance terms, it is comforting to notice that all the regressors have the expected and
statistically significant signs. As it is standard in all gravity models, the logarithm
of geographical distance has a negative and highly statistical significant coefficient,
implying that banks tend to have a lower amount of foreign claims in countries
that are farther away. Consistent with the literature, also the coefficients of the
dummies for countries sharing similar characteristics are positive and statistically
significant.
Having obtained the coefficients of the quarter/country dummies from the first
stage equation, we have then estimated the two second stage equations, respectively
for lending and borrowing countries. Since country specific characteristics are only
available at the year frequency, we have used in the second stage the yearly averages
of the quarterly dummies. Depending on the different specification, we end up with
a bit more than 600 country/year observations. As an additional caution against
the possibility that our results may be influenced by some extreme observations,
we have trimmed the fixed effects that we use as the dependent variable in the
second stage regression at the 1th and 99th percentiles.10 All our specifications
include as explanatory variables: a) the GDP level of the country, consistent with
the standard gravity equations model; b) the ratio of bank total assets to GDP,
to proxy for the degree of development of the banking sector; c) an index of the
restrictions to international capital movements; d) the ratio of the number of foreign
banks to total banks in the country; e) the number of foreign subsidiaries owned
by banks chartered in the country; f) the average size of banks measured by total
assets (first moment); g) the coefficient of variation of the size of banks measured by
total assets (second moment); and h) the skewness of the distribution of the size of
banks by total assets (third moment). In addition, to capture the impact on bank’s
international asset holdings of the degree of competition of each country’s banking
sector, that indeed could be otherwise captured by the skewness, our measure of the
asymmetry of the distribution of the size of banks by total assets, and the key object
of our analysis, we have included the Boone index of competition in the country’s
banking industry (that take higher values for lower levels of competitiveness). All
specifications also include year dummies. Reported standard errors are calculated
using White’s robust methodology.
Panel 1 of the bottom part of table 4 reports the results of the estimation of
equation (2) for lending countries, i.e. countries with claims abroad. The R2 of the
regression is 0.548. Surprisingly, we find that the size of the country and the degree
of development of the banking sector have a statistically insignificant impact on the
value of foreign claims. On the contrary, the presence of restrictions to international
10Reassuringly, the coefficients obtained from estimates on the whole sample from the
first and second stage regressions are very similar.
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capital movements and the incidence of multinational banking activities have a
robust statistically significant impact on bank foreign claims. As expected, banks
located in countries where stronger restrictions are imposed to international capital
movements have fewer cross-border claims. Countries whose banks own a larger
number of foreign bank subsidiaries lend less and borrow more from abroad. Those
where the share of total assets owned by foreign banks is larger are also larger
international lenders and borrowers.
Coming to the characteristics of the distribution of banks by size, the coefficient
of the average size of banks by total assets is positive, as expected, and statistically
significant at the 1% level in both our specifications. Higher dispersion, measured
by the coefficient of variation, has a negative impact on the value of international
claims, although the coefficient is statistically significance only in the case of lending
countries. On the contrary, we find evidence that the asymmetry of the distribu-
tion, measured by skewness, has a positive impact on bank international claims,
suggesting that countries with few large “national champions” acquire more claims
abroad. However, also in this case the statistical significance of the estimated co-
efficient is weak. Finally, we find no evidence that the degree of competition in the
banking sector impacts on its internationalization towards foreign markets.
Panel 2 of the bottom part of table 4 reports the results of the estimation of
equation (3) for borrowing countries, i.e. countries where banks hold foreign claims.
The R2 of the regression is 0.695.
The picture emerging from the analysis of borrowing countries is partly different
from that of lenders. Consistent with the literature on gravity equation models,
the logarithm of the country’s GDP has in this case a positive and statistically
significant coefficient, providing some evidence that banks are more likely to hold
foreign claims in larger countries. The degree of development of the banking sector
has instead an economically and statistically insignificant impact. As expected,
and as in the case of lending countries, the coefficient of the index of restrictions to
international capital movements is negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that foreign banks are less likely to invest in countries where international capital
movements are more restricted. More interestingly, and different from what found
in the case of lenders, the presence of multinational banks has a positive impact on
the amount of funding that a country obtains from abroad. Countries that own a
larger number of foreign subsidiaries and that host a larger share of foreign banks
obtain a higher amount of financing from overseas.
Coming to the characteristics of the distribution of bank size by total assets,
the focus of our analysis, Panel 2 of the bottom part of table 4 shows that countries
where banks are on average larger attract a higher amount of foreign claims, as
shown by the positive and highly significant coefficient. The coefficient of variation
has an insignificant impact, as shown by the negative and statistically insignificant
coefficient. Interestingly, the skewness, measuring the asymmetry of the distribu-
tion of banks’ asset in the borrowing country, has a positive coefficient, statistically
significant at the 5% level. Reassuringly, the degree of competition in the banking
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industry has a statistically insignificant effect.11
The impact of the characteristics of the distribution of banks by size on in-
ternational bank claims is not only statistically significant, but also economically
relevant. A change from the value at the 25th percentile to that at the 75th per-
centile of the distribution across countries of average bank size causes an increase
of about 40% in the level of international claims for lenders and 20% for borrowers.
An identical change in the value of the skewness has an impact of 7% for lenders
and 5% for borrowers, the same order of magnitude as that of the coefficient of
variation, that is 8% for lenders and 2% for borrowers.
Overall, our results suggest that countries with dual banking system, in which
some large banks coexist with a larger number of smaller credit intermediaries,
are more integrated within the international financial markets: as seen above they
lend more abroad, and they obtain more funding from abroad. And this holds
true controlling for the presence of multinational banks as well as for the degree
of competition in the banking industry. In other words, even after controlling for
average bank size, countries hosting some very large banks are more integrated in
the world financial markets. Large “national champions” stand out in dualistic
banking systems and are more capable of lending and, especially, of raising funds
abroad, possibly also acting as hubs for smaller domestic banks, as discussed more
extensively in the Introduction.12
6 Robustness checks
Our baseline results show that the skewness of the distribution of banks by
asset size has a significant role in explaining bank foreign claims. In this section we
refine our analysis considering four different dimensions. First, we focus on the de-
gree of development of the different countries. It is a well known fact that financial
development and international financial integration are increasing functions of the
income level of a country, a fact that is clear also from figure 1. For this reason,
we replicate our analysis considering only the subsample of high income countries,
according to the definition of the World Bank. We expect that this might have an
impact on our results if the fixed costs of acquiring foreign claims are lower within
11Although Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) provide evidence that at the aggregate local
claims in foreign currency of foreign affiliates are of very limited relevance, this may not
be the case for some emerging and developing countries like Ecuador, El Salvador and
Panama, that are fully dollarized, or others where the levels of foreign-currency denomi-
nated domestic loans is very high, such as Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Bulgaria and Hungary.
To check that our results are not affected by the role of local claims in foreign currencies,
we have estimated our model excluding all the countries listed above. Reassuringly, the
results are broadly unchanged. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this
potentially very relevant issue.
12Affinito and Pozzolo (2017) provide some evidence confirming that banks more active
in the international markets are also more interconnected within the domestic interbank
market.
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the set of more developed economies. Second, we distinguish the periods before
and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, that had a substantial impact especially
on international financial transactions. Third, we calculate the moments of the
distribution of bank size on other measures than total assets: equity, other earning
assets, and loans. Fourth, instead of considering the value of international claims
owned by banks towards all foreign sectors abroad, we limit our analysis to interna-
tional claims towards banks. Finally, we replicate our analysis considering the value
of international claims on an ultimate risk basis, rather than on the immediate risk
basis. With some caveats, the results of the robustness checks confirm those of our
baseline specification.
6.1 Country development
The top part of table 5 reports the results of first stage regression for the
subsample of high income countries, both on the side of lending and borrowing
countries, that includes just above 56, 000 observations. The R2, 0.280. Within the
subset of most developed countries, geographical distance and sharing a common
legal origin do not have a statistically significant impact on the amount of bilateral
claims held by banks. This is not entirely surprising, considering the sizable amount
of financial linkages among the world most important financial centers (London,
New York and Tokyio), that indeed benefit from covering geographical areasthat
are very far away from each other. Among this set of countries, proximity is not a
good proxy for the ability to collect information, neither the differences among the
legal systems, most likely because they are in all instances very advanced.
The results of the second stage regression for the lending countries, reported
in Panel 1 of the bottom part of table 5, broadly confirms the picture obtained
form the full sample, but with some differences. In particular, the coefficients of
the size of the country and of its banking market are not statistically significant,
neither is significant the coefficient of the number of banks owned abroad. The
presence of restrictions to international capital movements and the incidence of
multinational banking activities have instead a statistically significant impact on
bank international claims also in this smaller sample. Also the characteristics of the
distribution of banks by size have a very similar effect to that estimated on the whole
sample: the coefficient of the average size of banks by total assets is positive, as
expected, and statistically significant at the 1% level. Higher dispersion, measured
by the coefficient of variation, has a negative impact on the value of international
claims, although statistically insignificant, while the asymmetry of the distribution,
measured by skewness, has a positive impact on bank international claims, that is
also statistically insignificant.
Panel 2 of the bottom part of table 5 presents the results for the borrowing
countries. The picture that emerges in this case is even more similar to that ob-
tained form the full sample. The only difference is the lack of significance of the
coefficients of the index of international financial restrictions, that is likely to be
due to the limited variability in capital restrictions within high income countries.
Reassuringly, the coefficients of the average size of banks and, especially, of the
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skewness are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both speci-
fications. Even among more developed countries, hosting some very large banks
increases the ability to attract foreign claims. At the same time, also within this
sample, all the measures of the degree of competition in the banking industry have
a statistically insignificant effect.
6.2 Before and after the financial crisis
As already mentioned, the 2007-2008 financial crisis had a substantial impact
on international bank claims. For example, Buch et al. (2014b) presents evidence
of a contraction in the level of assets of foreign affiliates of German banks, and
Bouvatier and Delatte (2015) further confirms the financial disintegration process
that occurred within the Eurozone during the financial crises.
To verify the robustness of our results on the role of the asymmetry of the
distribution of bank size in explaining the level of international claims to the crisis
events, we have estimated our model separately for the years 2000-2006, before the
financial crisis, and for the years 2009-2013.13 The top part of table 6 shows that
the bilateral determinants of international bank claims have a similar effect in the
two sub-periods, although the size of the coefficients suggests that the impact of
country differences might have been stronger after the financial crisis, with the only
exception of sharing a common border.
Coming to the second-stage regressions, in the case of the lending countries,
Panels 1 and 2 of the bottom part of table 6 show that the results are very similar to
those of the regression on the full sample. Reassuringly, the coefficients of skewness
is positive and statistically significant in all our specifications, for both lending and
borrowing countries. This provides additional evidence in support of our claim that
dual banking systems are more integrated within the international financial system.
Panels 3 and 4 of the bottom part of table 6 show instead that the financial
crisis caused a major turmoil also in the determinants of bank foreign holdings.
In fact, very few of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Most
interesting, from the perspective of our research, the coefficients of the measure of
the asymmetry of the distribution are smaller in size and they are not statistically
significant, consistent with the view that the partial retrenchment and the higher
volatility of foreign claims shown in figure 1 was partly related to the role of larger
banks in borrowing countries.
6.3 Alternative size measures
An additional issue with our baseline analysis is the measure of bank size dis-
tribution. Although larger banks typically have more loans, more assets different
from loans, and larger equity, the relationship between these balance sheet items
and total assets is far from linear. For this reason we have estimated the second
13Results are broadly identical extending the subsamples to include the crisis period,
considering the years 2000-2007 and 2008-2013.
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stage regressions of equations (2) and (3) calculating the first, second and third
moments of the distribution of bank by the size of the gross loans, of total value of
other assets different from loans, and of the value of equity.
In the case of lending countries, panels 1-3 of table 7 show a picture broadly
consistent with our previous analysis. The most striking difference being the strong
statistical significance of the size of the country and the development of its banking
sector. As to the measures of the asymmetry of the distribution of banks by the
three asset classes considered, none of them has a statistically significant impact
on the amount if international claims held by banks abroad. On the contrary, for
borrowing countries, panels 4-6 of table 7 confirm a positive and statistically signif-
icant impact on claims held by foreign banks of the asymmetry of the distribution
calculated on all three alternative measures of the distribution of bank size.
6.4 International claims to banks
Our previous results suggest that the asymmetry of the distribution of banks
by size is relevant especially in the case of borrower countries, suggesting that
international investors look for safe and possibly too-big-to fail foreign counterparts.
If this is the case, our results should be confirmed also focusing specifically on
international claims to banks, instead of the broader category of international claims
to all sectors.
The top part of table 8 presents the results of the first stage regression, es-
timated on just above 93, 000 observations, with an R2 of 0.630. The bilateral
determinants of international claims to banks are very similar to those of the inter-
national claims to all sectors.
The results of the second-stage regressions present some dissimilarities with
respect to those on international bank claims towards all sectors of economic ac-
tivity. Panels 1 and 2 of the bottom part of table 8 show that the coefficients of
the size of the country are positive and statistically significant for both lenders and
borrowers. A more developed banking market, proxied by a higher ratio of bank
assets to GDP, has instead a negative impact on the amount of international claims
for lending countries, but a positive coefficient for borrowing countries. Of the two
measures of the internationalization of the banking industry, only the number of
subsidiaries owned abroad has a positive significant impact in the case of borrowing
countries. Coming to our variable of interest, the asymmetry of the distribution
of banks by total assets only has a statistically significant impact on the amount
of claims held by foreign banks in the borrowing countries, confirming that large
banks are better at attracting foreign funding.
6.5 Ultimate risk basis
Our last robustness check relates to the type of risk assumed by banks. BIS
data on bank international claims are available on an immediate risk basis and on
an ultimate risk basis. The former, that we have used in the analysis presented so
far, allocate each position “to the primary party to a contract”. The latter allocate
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instead each position ”to a third party that has contracted to assume the debts or
obligations of the primary party if that party fails to perform”. In this case, claims
are therefore allocated to the country and sector of the entity that guarantees them
(for example, in the case of claims on branches, the country of the parent bank).
Since it may well be the case that the geographical pattern of bank foreign
claims on an ultimate risk basis differs significantly from that on an immediate risk
basis, we have estimated all three equations (1), (3) and (2) on data on an ultimate
risk basis.
The top part of table 9 reports the results of the first stage estimates. The
number of observations is in this case just above 136, 000 and the R2 is 0.615. The
results are similar to those obtained from the regression on claims on an immediate
risk basis, with the exception of the coefficient for countries sharing a common legal
system, that is in this case negative and statistically significant. This difference
suggests that some of the claims on an immediate basis are granted by entities
located in other countries.
The estimates of the second stage regression provide some interesting additional
insights with respect to the evidence emerging from the analysis if the claims on
an immediate risk basis. Panel 1 of the bottom part of table 9 shows that larger
countries are more likely to hold foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis, while
the development of the banking sector has no significant impact. As expected,
restrictions on foreign capital movements have instead a negative impact on the
value of foreign claims. Contrary to the case of claims on immediate risk basis,
focusing on ultimate risk we find that a larger number of foreign owned subsidiaries
has a negative effect on the share of international claims held in borrowing countries,
suggesting that foreign subsidiaries are used for funding, but not for risk transfer.
What is most interesting is the significant impact of all three dimensions of the
distribution of banks by asset size: foreign lending on an ultimate risk basis is more
common for countries where the average size of banks is larger, the dispersion is
lower and the asymmetry of the distribution is stronger. Our evidence suggests
therefore that large “national champions” provide a larger amount of risk coverage
abroad. Finally, the coefficient of the Boone index is positive and statistically
significant, but does not alter the significance of our other coefficients of interest.
Panels 3 and 4 of the bottom part of table 9 also provide a rather different
picture form that obtained from the analysis of claims on an immediate risk basis.
Larger countries and those with more developed banking sectors are more likely
to hold foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis, the restrictions on foreign capital
movements have as expected a negative impact on the value of foreign claims, and
the presence of foreign banks increases the likelihood of being granted risk coverage.
What is less obvious is that countries that hold a larger number of subsidiaries
abroad are less likely to be granted risk coverage. Finally, the coefficient of the
skewness of the distribution of banks by total assets is not statistically significant,
suggesting that large “national champions” are more likely to obtain funding, but
not to obtain risk coverage from abroad.
18
6.6 The role of foreign banks
Finally, since the presence of foreign banks can be a crucial issue affecting our
analysis, in addition to controlling for its direct effect, we have also verified whether
it impacts on the relationship between the skewness of the distribution of bank size.
To this aim, we have included in the baseline specification the interaction of the
share of foreign banks and of the number of banks owned abroad with the skewness
of the distribution of banks by total assets.14
The results, reported in table 10, show that the presence of foreign banks damp-
ens the impact of the skewness of the distribution of banks by asset size on the value
of international claims. Indeed, the negative coefficients of the interaction terms
estimated in three of the four cases considered imply that a direct presence of
foreign banks is a substitute in international transactions to having larger banks.
Reassuringly, for the entire set of values of foreign bank presence in our sample,
the marginal effect of the skewness of the distribution remains economically and
statistically significant.
7 Conclusions
Building on the standard framework of gravity regression models, we have es-
timated the relationship between the distribution of bank asset size on a country’s
propensity to engage in international banking. Our results confirm that cross-
border bank linkages are explained by the variables normally considered in the
gravity literature, such as country size and distance, but that they are also related
to measures of the asymmetry of the distribution of banks’ size. In particular, coun-
tries with a dual banking system, where a small number of very large banks, the
so-called “national champions”, coexist with a large number of smaller banks, are
more integrated within the international financial system. Such integration comes
both from a higher amount of claims held abroad and, to a larger extent, from a
higher amount of foreign liabilities.
This pattern is robust as it is also confirmed when controlling for the degree of
competition in the banking industry, suggesting that the asymmetry of the distribu-
tion does not proxy for market concentration, and for the presence of multinational
banks. Our findings are consistent with a dual banking system in which large banks
clearly stand out as financial partners in international capital markets.
These banks face a lower incidence of the fixed costs and, what is more, act
as hubs for smaller, domestic banks. They are notable also because of too-big-to-
fail expectations. In fact, on the one hand, lending to a country is likely to be
safer when a few large banks clearly stand out as too-big-too fail. On the other
hand, countries with few very large banks are more likely to provide risk coverage to
other countries, as it emerges from the analysis of the data on an ultimate risk basis,
because these financial intermediaries have a stronger incentive to take o risk since
they perceive themselves as too-big-to-fail. Consistent with this interpretation, our
14We thank an anonymous reviewer also for this interesting suggestion.
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findings are confirmed by a number of robustness checks, and, at the same time,
they are not confirmed for the period following the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. Our effect of a dualistic banking system vanished when even the large banks
stopped perceiving themselves and being perceived as too-big-to-fail, and a large
number of idiosyncratic shocks have increased the variability of bank cross-border
claims.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first to focus on the impact
of the distribution of banks by asset size on the internationalization of the bank-
ing sector. In this sense, we extend the insights on the impact of firm size on
international trade flows and FDIs in the manufacturing sector recently found by
(Barba Navaretti et al. , 2015, and Pietrovito et al., 2013) to the cross-border activ-
ities of banks. Our results have straightforward but important policy implications,
confirming that larger banks have a disproportionally higher impact on financial
globalization, therefore being a channel for both risk diversification opportunities
and, yet, higher risks of contagion.
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Figure 1: International claims by country groups
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Name Description Source
Total claims Annual average of quarterly values of international claims by country and year (1 + log.) BIS Consolidated banking statistics
Average bank size (log) Average value of total assets of the banks by country and year (1 + log.) Bankscope
Dispersion of bank size Coefficient of variation of the distribution of total assets of the banks by country and year Bankscope
Skewness of bank size Skeweness of the distribution of total assets of the banks by country and year Bankscope
GDP (log) Gross domestic product by country and year (log) IMF, World Economic Outlook
Competition (Boone index) Elasticity of bank profits to bank marginal costs by country and year; World Bank, Global financial data base
an increase implies lower competition
and marginal costs by country and year; an increase implies lower competition
Foreign banks (share) Ratio of the number of foreign banks to that of total banks by country and year World Bank, Global financial data base
Banks owned abroad (no.) Number of subsidiaries owned abroad by banks in the country (Claessens and van Horen (2014))
International fin. restr. Index of overall restrictions on capital movements by country and year Fernandez et al. (2015)
Bank assets/GDP Value of total bank assets over GDP by country and year World Bank, Global financial data base
Distance (log) Weighted bilateral distance between lending and borrowing countries (log.) CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago (2011))
Common legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if in the lending and borrowing countries share a common legal origin CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago (2011))
Common border Dummy taking the value of 1 if the lending and borrowing countries share a common border CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago (2011))
Common language Dummy taking the value of 1 if in the lending and borrowing countries a common language is spoken CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago (2011))
by at least 9% of the population
Common colonizer Dummy taking the value of 1 if the lending and borrowing countries share a common colonizer CEPII database (Mayer and Zignago (2011))
Table 1: List of the variables used in the regressions
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Obs. Mean Coeff. var. Median p10 p90
Lending countries
Total claims (1+log) 2,395 78.84 3.52 0.00 0.00 215.12
Mean of bank size 1,166 17.40 1.77 6.62 1.79 45.60
Dispersion of bank size 1,077 1.23 0.83 0.94 0.24 2.78
Skewness of bank size 1,073 1.86 1.14 1.16 0.00 4.93
GDP (1+log) 1,840 4.67 0.40 4.64 2.44 7.19
Competition (Boone index) 1,857 -0.07 -1.94 -0.06 -0.18 0.04
Foreign banks (share) 1,739 38.17 0.72 37.00 1.00 78.00
Banks owned abroad (no.) 2,395 678.65 4.22 1.06 0.00 1052.67
International fin. restr. 1,380 0.35 0.95 0.20 0.00 0.85
Distance (log) 2,293 8.62 0.08 8.74 7.96 9.23
Common legal origin 2,293 0.31 1.04 0.27 0.00 1.00
Common border 2,293 0.01 3.67 0.00 0.00 0.04
Common language 2,293 0.26 1.28 0.11 0.00 1.00
Common colonizer 2,293 0.13 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.43
Number of banks 2,128 83.48 3.71 17.00 3.00 127.00
Borrowing countries
Total claims (1+log) 2,912 64.84 1.23 30.78 1.39 179.42
Mean of bank size 1,192 17.20 1.78 6.50 1.75 45.60
Dispersion of bank size 1,089 1.22 0.83 0.93 0.24 2.78
Skewness of bank size 1,085 1.84 1.14 1.16 0.00 4.90
GDP (1+log) 1,999 4.43 0.45 4.36 2.06 7.10
Competition (Boone index) 1,982 -0.07 -1.91 -0.06 -0.18 0.04
Lerner index 1,684 0.27 0.55 0.26 0.12 0.44
Foreign banks (share) 1,808 38.23 0.72 37.00 1.00 78.00
Banks owned abroad (no.) 2,912 173.13 3.95 0.00 0.00 285.80
International fin. restr. 1,400 0.36 0.93 0.23 0.00 0.85
Distance (log) 2,730 8.63 0.06 8.77 7.75 9.21
Common legal origin 2,730 0.28 0.62 0.32 0.00 0.45
Common border 2,730 0.02 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.07
Common language 2,730 0.18 1.02 0.16 0.00 0.43
Common colonizer 2,730 0.09 1.05 0.07 0.00 0.19
Number of banks 2,393 74.33 3.94 13.00 2.00 117.00
Variables are defined in table 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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Lending countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Total claims (1+log) 1.00
2 Mean of bank size 0.37* 1.00
3 Dispersion of bank size 0.56* 0.63* 1.00
4 Skewness of bank size 0.52* 0.48* 0.94* 1.00
5 GDP (1+log) 0.38* 0.39* 0.68* 0.66* 1.00
6 Competition (Boone index) -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 1.00
7 Foreign banks (no.) -0.22* -0.05* -0.24* -0.27* -0.40* -0.04 1.00
8 Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.58* 0.39* 0.76* 0.72* 0.53* -0.23* 1.00
9 International fin. restr. -0.28* -0.24* -0.36* -0.29* 0.06* 0.04 -0.15* -0.25* 1.00
10 Distance (log) -0.04* -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09* 0.11* -0.10* -0.04 0.13* 1.00
11 Common legal origin -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.22* -0.02 0.14* 0.03 0.03 0.06* 1.00
12 Common border 0.10* 0.02 0.17* 0.18* 0.26* 0.05* 0.02 0.13* -0.10* -0.24* -0.08* 1.00
13 Common language -0.12* -0.02 -0.09* -0.09* -0.35* 0.03 0.25* -0.05* -0.13* 0.23* 0.55* -0.14* 1.00
14 Common colonizer -0.08* -0.01 -0.09* -0.10* -0.28* 0.02 0.13* 0.01 0.01 0.13* 0.53* -0.12* 0.49* 1.00
15 Number of banks 0.40* 0.19* 0.56* 0.57* 0.44* 0.02 -0.15* 0.75* -0.13* -0.00 -0.04 0.12* -0.03 -0.07* 1.00
Borrowing countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Total claims (1+log) 1.00
2 Mean of bank size 0.54* 1.00
3 Dispersion of bank size 0.82* 0.64* 1.00
4 Skewness of bank size 0.76* 0.49* 0.94* 1.00
5 GDP (1+log) 0.68* 0.39* 0.68* 0.66* 1.00
6 Competition (Boone index) 0.02 0.05 0.08* 0.04 0.01 1.00
7 Foreign banks (no.) -0.13* -0.05 -0.24* -0.26* -0.39* -0.05 1.00
8 Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.66* 0.38* 0.76* 0.72* 0.53* 0.06* -0.23* 1.00
9 International fin. restr. -0.31* -0.24* -0.36* -0.30* 0.04 0.03 -0.13* -0.25* 1.00
10 Distance (log) -0.33* -0.07* -0.19* -0.16* -0.15* 0.07* -0.03 -0.17* 0.14* 1.00
11 Common legal origin -0.08* 0.10* 0.12* 0.10* -0.17* 0.13* 0.02 0.15* -0.11* 0.34* 1.00
12 Common border 0.49* 0.18* 0.53* 0.51* 0.28* -0.01 -0.05* 0.47* -0.28* -0.51* -0.11* 1.00
13 Common language -0.16* 0.10* 0.09* 0.07* -0.24* 0.07* 0.22* 0.14* -0.12* 0.42* 0.30* -0.23* 1.00
14 Common colonizer -0.29* 0.08* -0.02 -0.03 -0.31* 0.03 0.17* 0.13* 0.02 0.34* 0.22* -0.26* 0.50* 1.00
15 Number of banks 0.48* 0.19* 0.56* 0.57* 0.43* 0.02* -0.15* 0.75* -0.13* -0.04* -0.01 0.25* 0.06* -0.07* 1.00
Variables are defined in table 1; ∗ indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 3: Bilateral correlations
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First stage regression
International claims (log)
Distance (log) -0.059***
(0.004)
Common language 0.062***
(0.009)
Common colonizer 0.089***
(0.012)
Common legal origin 0.007
(0.006)
Common border 0.129***
(0.016)
R2 0.268
Obs. 153,087
Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2)
GDP (log) -0.004 0.030***
(0.017) (0.007)
Bank assets/GDP 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
International fin. restr. -0.338*** -0.079***
(0.048) (0.022)
Foreign banks (share) -0.003*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.035*** 0.013***
(0.011) (0.004)
Mean of bank size (log) 0.210*** 0.107***
(0.027) (0.011)
Dispersion of bank size -0.109** -0.009
(0.051) (0.020)
Skewness of bank size 0.045** 0.017**
(0.020) (0.007)
Competition (Boone index) -0.063 0.040
(0.085) (0.030)
R2 0.548 0.695
Obs. 646 651
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1). The de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of the value of international bank claims of the reporting
country (lender) in the partner country (borrower), on an immediate risk basis. The re-
gression includes time*lenders and time*borrowers fixed effects. The bottom part of the
table presents the results of the estimation of equations (2) and (3). The dependent vari-
ables are the time-varying time*lenders and time-borrowers fixed effects estimated from
equation (1). All explanatory variables are defined in table 1. Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 4: All countries
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First stage regression
International claims (log)
Distance (log) 0.002
(0.008)
Common language 0.063***
(0.020)
Common colonizer 0.048*
(0.025)
Common legal origin -0.001
(0.013)
Common border 0.176***
(0.025)
R2 0.280
Obs. 56,175
Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2)
GDP (log) -0.039 0.028***
(0.028) (0.010)
Bank assets/GDP -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
International fin. restr. -0.348*** 0.017
(0.090) (0.042)
Foreign banks (share) -0.004*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.022 0.021***
(0.015) (0.005)
Mean of bank size (log) 0.357*** 0.127***
(0.048) (0.015)
Dispersion of bank size -0.070 -0.032
(0.079) (0.029)
Skewness of bank size 0.052 0.029***
(0.032) (0.011)
Competition (Boone index) -0.033 0.024
(0.116) (0.040)
R2 0.528 0.681
Obs. 408 412
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) on the
sub-sample of high-income lending and borrowing countries, according to the definition
of the World Bank. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the value of international
bank claims of the reporting country (lender) in the partner country (borrower), on an
immediate risk basis. The regression includes time*lenders and time*borrowers fixed
effects. The bottom part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equations (2)
and (3). The dependent variables are the time-varying time*lenders and time-borrowers
fixed effects estimated from equation (1). All explanatory variables are defined in table 1.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level,
∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 5: High income countries
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First stage regression
2000-2006 2009-2013
(1) (2)
Distance (log) -0.060*** -0.098***
(0.005) (0.007)
Common language 0.056*** 0.050***
(0.013) (0.017)
Common colonizer 0.076*** 0.106***
(0.017) (0.022)
Common legal origin 0.007 0.018
(0.009) (0.012)
Common border 0.147*** 0.113***
(0.021) (0.030)
R2 0.269 0.263
Obs. 76,200 63,099
Second stage regression
Pre-crisis period: 2000-2006 Post-crisis period: 2009-2013
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP (log) -0.029 0.024*** 0.031 0.055***
(0.023) (0.009) (0.030) (0.017)
Bank assets/GDP -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
International fin. restr. -0.269*** -0.079*** -0.453*** -0.103*
(0.054) (0.027) (0.126) (0.061)
Foreign banks (share) -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.004** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.051*** 0.016*** -0.006 0.011
(0.014) (0.005) (0.027) (0.009)
Mean of bank size (log) 0.204*** 0.126*** 0.341*** 0.100***
(0.033) (0.013) (0.066) (0.024)
Dispersion of bank size -0.128** -0.026 -0.056 0.027
(0.061) (0.024) (0.116) (0.059)
Skewness of bank size 0.073*** 0.026*** 0.005 0.010
(0.026) (0.010) (0.042) (0.019)
Competition (Boone index) -0.132 0.009 0.200 0.007
(0.104) (0.038) (0.188) (0.109)
R2 0.538 0.678 0.655 0.766
Obs. 428 433 134 131
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) separately
for two sub-samples, before and after the financial crisis. The years 2007 and 2008 are
excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the value of inter-
national bank claims of the reporting country (lender) in the partner country (borrower),
on an immediate risk basis. The regression includes time*lenders and time*borrowers fixed
effects. The bottom part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equations (2)
and (3). The dependent variables are the time-varying time*lenders and time-borrowers
fixed effects estimated from equation (1). All explanatory variables are defined in table 1.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level,
∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 6: Normal and crisis times
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Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP (log) 0.036** 0.037* 0.018 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.039***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Bank assets/GDP 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
International fin. restr. -0.388*** -0.422*** -0.362*** -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.091***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.054) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024)
Foreign banks (share) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.028** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.016***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mean of bank size (other) (log) 0.133*** 0.066***
(0.020) (0.007)
Skewness of bank size (other) -0.005 0.010***
(0.008) (0.003)
Mean of bank size (equity) 0.144*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.010)
Skewness of bank size (equity) -0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.002)
Mean of bank size (loans) 0.147*** 0.087***
(0.023) (0.009)
Skewness of bank size (loans) 0.007 0.010***
(0.008) (0.003)
Competition (Boone index) -0.074 -0.014 -0.066 0.077** 0.099*** 0.063**
(0.086) (0.088) (0.084) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
R2 0.518 0.518 0.523 0.648 0.655 0.667
Obs. 590 571 615 595 574 620
The table presents the results of the estimation of equations (2) and (3) measuring bank
size according to the value of total loans, of other assets than loans, and of equity. The
dependent variables are the time-varying time*lenders and time-borrowers fixed effects
estimated from equation (1) on the entire sample. All explanatory variables are defined
in table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at
10% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 7: Alternative size measures
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First stage regression
International claims to banks (log)
Distance (log) -0.054***
(0.005)
Common language 0.015
(0.014)
Common colonizer 0.194***
(0.017)
Common legal origin 0.050***
(0.009)
Common border 0.538***
(0.020)
R2 0.630
Obs. 93,279
Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2)
GDP (log) 0.324*** 0.040***
(0.103) (0.014)
Bank assets/GDP -0.006*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.000)
International fin. restr. -0.655* -0.112***
(0.392) (0.034)
Foreign banks (share) 0.006 -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Banks owned abroad (no.) -0.065 0.061***
(0.042) (0.008)
Mean of bank size (log) 0.411*** 0.202***
(0.149) (0.019)
Dispersion of bank size -0.104 -0.033
(0.240) (0.037)
Skewness of bank size 0.160 0.025*
(0.103) (0.014)
Competition (Boone index) 0.618** -0.213***
(0.272) (0.059)
R2 0.383 0.760
Obs. 249 648
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) using
as dependent variable the logarithm of the value of international bank claims of the
reporting country (lender) to banks in the partner country (borrower), instead of all
international claims, on an immediate risk basis. The regression includes time*lenders
and time*borrowers fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the results of
the estimation of equations (2) and (3). The dependent variables are the time-varying
time*lenders and time-borrowers fixed effects estimated from equation (1). All explana-
tory variables are defined in table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
∗ indicates significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 8: Claims to banks
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First stage regression
International claims to banks (log)
Distance (log) -0.412***
(0.011)
Common language 0.902***
(0.025)
Common colonizer 0.833***
(0.034)
Common legal origin -0.117***
(0.018)
Common border 0.642***
(0.042)
R2 0.615
Obs. 136,424
Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2)
GDP (log) 0.500*** 0.372***
(0.110) (0.040)
Bank assets/GDP 0.002 0.004***
(0.003) (0.001)
International fin. restr. -4.463*** -0.629***
(0.847) (0.123)
Foreign banks (share) 0.001 0.005***
(0.004) (0.001)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.215*** -0.051**
(0.050) (0.025)
Mean of bank size (log) 0.699*** 0.411***
(0.185) (0.056)
Dispersion of bank size -1.165*** 0.176*
(0.258) (0.099)
Skewness of bank size 0.413*** 0.014
(0.091) (0.039)
Competition (Boone index) 0.809* -0.176
(0.417) (0.157)
R2 0.682 0.682
Obs. 241 654
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) using
as dependent variable the logarithm of the value of international bank claims of the
reporting country (lender) in the partner country (borrower) measured on an ultimate
risk basis, instead of on an immediate risk basis. The regression includes time*lenders
and time*borrowers fixed effects. The bottom part of the table presents the results of
the estimation of equations (2) and (3). The dependent variables are the time-varying
time*lenders and time-borrowers fixed effects estimated from equation (1). All explana-
tory variables are defined in table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
∗ indicates significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 9: Ultimate risk basis
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Second stage regression
Lenders’ fixed effects Borrowers’ fixed effects
(1) (2)
GDP (log) -0.015 0.024***
(0.017) (0.008)
Bank assets/GDP -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Intern. fin. restricions -0.326*** -0.066***
(0.050) (0.024)
Foreign banks (share) -0.000 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Banks owned abroad (no.) 0.105*** 0.048***
(0.022) (0.008)
Mean (Bank asset distr.) (log) 0.218*** 0.109***
(0.029) (0.012)
Coeff. var. (Bank asset distr.) -0.039 -0.008
(0.052) (0.021)
Skewness (Bank asset distr.) 0.081*** 0.037***
(0.022) (0.009)
Skewness * Foreign banks -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Skewness * Banks owned abroad -0.010*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.001)
Boone competition index -0.088 0.023
(0.078) (0.036)
R2 0.586 0.707
Obs. 651 651
The top part of the table presents the results of the estimation of equation (1). The de-
pendent variable is the logarithm of the value of international bank claims of the reporting
country (lender) in the partner country (borrower), on an immediate risk basis. The re-
gression includes time*lenders and time*borrowers fixed effects. The bottom part of the
table presents the results of the estimation of equations (2) and (3). The dependent vari-
ables are the time-varying time*lenders and time-borrowers fixed effects estimated from
equation (1). All explanatory variables are defined in table 1. Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗∗∗ at 1%.
Table 10: Interactions with incidence of foreign banks
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